Juanita Taft Rogers v. The Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah: Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Juanita Taft Rogers v. The Division of Real Estate of
the Department of Business Regulation of the State
of Utah: Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary H. Weight; Alldredge, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Sheila Page; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Rogers v. The Division of Real Estate, No. 890021 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1524




K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. ttqooai 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 890021-CA 
Priority NO. 14a 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Petition for Judicial Review of the final order of the 
Utah Real Estate Commission and Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulation revoking the license of 
Petitioner to practice as a principal broker in the 
State of Utah. Administrative hearing held September 20, 
1988 before J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge. 
Case No. RE-87-08-02. 
GARY H. WEIGHT 
Alldredge, Nelson, Weight 
& Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General of Utah 
SHEILA PAGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
Attorneys for R{ rab 
OCT 51989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 890021-CA 
Priority NO. 14a 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Petition for Judicial Review of the final order of the 
Utah Real Estate Commission and Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulation revoking the license of 
Petitioner to practice as a principal broker in the 
State of Utah. Administrative hearing held September 20, 
1988 before J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge. 
Case No. RE-87-08-02. 
GARY H. WEIGHT 
Alldredge, Nelson, Weight 
& Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General of Utah 
SHEILA PAGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITITES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I 9 
THE GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS URGED UPON THE 
COURT BY PETITIONER DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING. 
A. The General Statute of Limitations found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) has no application to a 
controversy not involving an "action" or "cause 
of action". 
B. Had the Legislature intended for there to be a 
statute of limitations for administrative licensing 
disciplinary actions, it would have established one 
within the specific statutes governing the Department 
of Business Regulations or the Division of Real Estate. 
POINT II 14 
THE COMMISSION'S ACTION IN REVOKING THE LICENSE OF 
PETITIONER TO PRACTICE AS A PRINCIPAL BROKER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
CONCLUSION 20 
APPENDIX 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
UTAH CASESt 
In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988) 15 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). . . . 8,14,15 
OTHER CASESt 
Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Jorgensen, 
599 P.2d 869 11 
Commerce City Drug v. State Board of Pharmacy, 
511 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1973) 10 
In re Kindschi, 52 Wash.2d 8, 319 P.2d 824 (1958) 10 
Nelson v. Real Estate Commission, 35 Md.App. 334, 
370 A.2d 613 (1977) 10 
State Ex Re. Schneider v. McAfee, 2 Kan.App. 274, 
578 P.2d 281 (1978) 12 
Trimble v. American Sav. Life Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1131 
(Ariz. App. 1986) 12 
OTHER AUTHORITY! 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S 13-1-1 13,14 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-1 13 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-5.5(1) (c) 2 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11(8) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11(15) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-12(1) (b) 1 
Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-l 11 
6TATUTBS, cont. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (a) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-1 9 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(2) 2,9,11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-33 2,11 
RULE 
Rule 9(a)(7)-Administrative Rules of the Division of Real 
Estate (Effective prior to July 1985) 17 
STATUTES REPRODUCED 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11 (Effective May 12, 1981) 
The board or the commission may upon its own motion, 
and shall upon the verified complaint in writing of any person, 
investigate or cause to be investigated the actions of any real 
estate broker or real estate salesman, or any person who shall 
assume to act as such, within this state, and may suspend or 
revoke any license issued under the provisions of this chapter at 
any time where the licensee has by false or fraudulent 
representation obtained a license, or where the licensee in 
performing or attempting to perform any of the acts mentioned in 
this capter is found guilty of: 
(8) Being unworthy or incompetent to act as a real 
estate broker or salesman in such a manner as 
to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(15) Willful or deliberate violation or disregard 
of the provisions of this chapter or of the 
rules and regulations of the commission. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated SS 63-46(b)-16 and 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition from the Final Order of the Utah 
Real Estate Commission and the Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulation revoking the license of 
Petitioner to practice as a principal broker in the State of 
Utah. Consistent with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 61-2-12(1)(b), the Final Order in this matter issued 
December 15, 1988. Petitioner filed this petition for review 
with the instant court on January 12, 1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in 
denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss based on his finding that 
no Statute of Limitations governed the initiation of an action in 
an administrative setting. 
II. Whether the Order of the Utah Real Estate 
Commission was reasonable and rational. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE 
The following statutes are determinative of this case, 
and must therefore be considered by the Court: 
1. Utah Code Ann. SS 61-2-11, 61-2-11(8), 61-2-11(15) 
(1953, as amended). 
2. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-25(2), 78-12-33 (1953, as 
amended). 
Due to the length of these statutes, they are 
reproduced in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Judicial Review of an order of 
the Utah Real Estate Commission ("Commission") revoking Juanita 
Taft Rogers' ("Petitioner's") license to practice as a real 
estate principal broker in the State of Utah. The administrative 
action against Petitioner's real estate license was filed by the 
Division of Real Estate ("Division") via a petition dated 
November 25, 1987, in Case No. RE-87-08-02. Petitioner 
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 13, 1988, the 
original date for hearing, based upon a claim that the action of 
the Division of Real Estate was barred by a statute of 
limitations. Limited oral argument was taken on the motion at 
that time and counsel for the respective parties subsequently 
filed memoranda with the court. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss 
was denied in an Order dated July 21, 1988. On September 20, 
1988 the case against petitioner came on for hearing before J. 
Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge of the Department of 
Business Regulation. This hearing was delegated to Judge Eckund 
for hearing by the Utah Real Estate Commission as per Utah Code 
Annotated §61-2-5.5(1)(c). Based on the evidence taken in the 
hearing, Judge Ecklund made Recommended Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order to the Utah Real 
Estate Commission on December 14, 1988. On December 14, 1988, 
the Utah Real Estate Commissioners, by unanimous action, adopted 
Judge Ecklund's Recommended Findings, Conclusions and Order as 
their own, and on December 15, 1988, William E. Dunn, Executive 
Director of the Department of Business Regulation confirmed and 
approved the order as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are from the Commission's findings 
and apparently are undisputed by Petitioner. 
1. Sometime in 1973, Petitioner became licensed as a 
sales agent by the Division of Real Estate. As relevant herein, 
Petitioner was affiliated with principal broker David R. Harman 
as of January 1982. On September 1, 1982, she terminated her 
affiliation with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with principal 
broker A.J. Michaels. 
2. By Order, dated August 17, 1983, Petitioner's 
license was suspended for one year and thereafter placed on 
probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. 
Said order was based on conduct which occurred between December 
10, 1981 and August 22, 1982. Petitioner's conduct in that 
regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation 
of the fiduciary duty owed to her clients in that transaction. 
Petitioner subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on 
January 15, 1987, 
3. In January, 1982, Barbara Homeyer contacted 
Petitioner to obtain her services in purchasing a home. Ms. 
Homeyer, who was recently divorced resided in a home jointly 
owned by herself and her ex-husband. Since there had been no 
property settlement relative to her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's ex-
husband was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, 
the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide a down 
payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various 
items of inherited personal property. 
4. During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Petitioner 
entered into a verbal agreement, whereby Respondent was to act as 
Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective 
seller who would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down 
payment for the purchase of a home. On February 21, 1982, 
Petitioner and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer 
then delivered that property to Petitioner, which was held in 
storage under Petitioner's control. The property was so 
transferred to Petitioner as the means to provide a safe place 
for its storage and facilitate Petitioner's access to that 
property if a prospective seller was located. 
5. Between February and late-April 1982, Petitioner 
and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two properties for possible 
purchase. In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as 
too those items of Ms. Homeyer's personal property which would be 
acceptable in lieu of a cash down payment. When it became 
apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the above-
described terms would be realized, she authorized Petitioner to 
sell certain items as the means to provide cash for the down 
payment necessary to purchase a home. 
6. During March and April 1982, Petitioner had some of 
Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and certain items were sold in 
antique shows. However, as of late April 1982, no progress in 
locating a suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer had 
received no monies from Petitioner relative to the sale of some 
of her property and Petitioner had taken certain property from 
storage and sold it without Ms. Homeyer's authorization. 
Further, Petitioner never advised her principal broker of her 
activities no did she deliver to him any of the funds she 
obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property. 
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer 
underwent foot surgery and was advised that her condition could 
be cancerous. At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home 
would be found and whether that would occur prior to her possible 
death. On May 5, 1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Petitioner and they 
executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of 
her personal property to Petitioner for sale and/or exchange and 
authorized Petitioner to liquidate that property. The agreement 
further provided that if all property held by Petitioner was not 
liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the remaining funds 
would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor 
children. 
8. During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was never 
advised as to the status of her property and was unable to 
contact Petitioner in that regard. In mid-July 1982, Ms. Homeyer 
retained counsel and made written demand that Petitioner return 
all personal property in her possession and provide an accounting 
as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property 
which had been in her possession. 
9. By letter, dated October 21, 1982, Peitioner 
generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts which had been 
undertaken to appraise, restore, and/or sell some of the property 
in her possession. Petitioner further mentioned various costs 
incurred as to th€> appraisal and restoration of that property. 
Petitioner also reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken 
to produce funds necessary for a down payment for a home or 
condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had 
yet been identified. Petitioner requested Ms. Homeyer to keep 
her posted "about what you want to do with the housing thing" and 
she advised Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse 
duplex and pondered that Ms. Homeyer could live in one side and 
rent the other. 
10. By letter, dated October 28, 1982, Ms. Homeyer 
advised Petitioner that purchase of the duplex would not be 
economically feasible and reiterated that no accounting had been 
received as to the status of her property or any disposition 
thereof. By letter, dated October 29, 1982, a second demand was 
made that Petitioner return all items of personal property 
entrusted to her. When compliance with that demand was not 
forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No accounting was 
provided to Ms. Homeyer until July 9, 1986, when Petitioner 
returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin. 
11. By stipulation, dated October 7, 1986, Ms. Homeyer 
and Petitioner identified the status of some of the property 
which had been in Petitioner's possession. That property 
consisted of guns, cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin 
collection, silver, jewelry, flatware, china, pewter, furniture, 
household and other miscellaneous items. The value of the 
property which Petitioner sold was agreed to have been $6,530.50 
and Petitioner received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property. 
It was agreed that certain property, valued at $6,799.50, was 
delivered by Petitioner to third parties and that said property 
had not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer. It was also agreed that 
certain property still in Petitioner's possession should be 
valued at $4,820.50. 
12. Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had 
delivered to Petitioner was subsequently returned to her. 
However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated 
October 30, 1986, the Court concluded that Petitioner had sold 
some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with 
Ms. Homeyer's possession and control of some of the property by 
intentionally refusing to return it and had converted the 
proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use. 
By reason thereof, the Court entered judgment on October 30, 1986 
in favor of Ms. Homeyer totaling $2,035.50 as a result of 
Petitioner's breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. 
Homeyer, $4,495.00 as a result of Petitioner's conversion of 
proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a result of 
result of Petitioner's conversion of property upon transferring 
that property to others and $4,820.50 as a result of Petitioner's 
conversion of property still in her possession. 
13. The record also reflects that Petitioner initiated 
bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the 
October 30, 1986 judgment against her, an order was entered in 
those bankruptcy proceedings relative to Petitioner, whereby the 
just-stated judgment was discharged. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Administrative disciplinary actions are neither civil 
nor criminal, and are therefore not subject to general statutes 
of limitation governing those types of proceedings. Had the Utah 
Legislature intended for administrative disciplinary actions 
involving real estate licensees to be subject to a statute of 
limitations, it would have included one in the statutory scheme 
governing the real estate profession. However, not only did the 
Legislature elect not to impose a statute of limitations, but 
specified that disciplinary action could be taken "at any time" 
that a licensee was found guilty of licensing law violations. 
This case is subject to the pre-Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act standard of review found in Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P,2d 
601 (Utah 1983). The Court must determine whether the 
Commission's conclusions of law and order of revocation were 
reasonable and rational, while according due deference to the 
Commission's specialized knowledge and expertise. The facts in 
this case clearly indicate that Petitioner did not act in her 
client's best interest, breached the fiduciary duty she owed as 
an agent to her principal, and caused considerable financial 
damage to her client. Inasmuch as the Commission constitutes a 
"jury of Petitioner's peers," it was in the best position to 
determine that her actions were a violation of both rule and law 
governing the real estate profession, and that the best way to 
protect the public's welfare was to revoke Petitioner's real 
estate license. The Commission's actions were both reasonable 
and rational, and should therefore be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS URGED UPON 
THE COURT BY PETITIONER DOES NOT APPLY TO AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING 
A. The General Statute of Limitations found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-2(2) has no application to a controversy not 
involving an "action" or a "cause of action". 
The Petitioner would have this court accept that the 
administrative disciplinary action taken against her license was 
a "civil " proceeding, and therefore subject to the general 
statute of limitations found in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-1, et 
seq. (1953, as amended). This position completely ignores the 
special position administrative actions have in the law. 
Administrative actions are neither civil nor criminal 
proceedings. 
Petitioner places great emphasis on her position that 
administrative actions are "civil actions", and defines a "civil 
action" as "an adversary proceeding for redress, enforcement or 
protection of a right, or prevention of a wrong." (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 8, emphasis added.) However, a hearing before an 
administrative board is not adversary. An administrative board 
represents "public interests entrusted to boards, whereas courts 
are concerned with litigating rights of parties with adverse 
interests." Black's Law Dictionary/ Revised 5th Ed. 1979. 
Administrative proceedings which involve possible 
disciplinary sanction as to licensees are neither strictly civil 
nor criminal in nature. The Washington Supreme Court addressed 
this issue in In re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 319 P.2d 824 (1958), 
when it held: 
It is somewhat difficult to classify a medical 
disciplnary proceeding. It is characterized as civil, 
not criminal, in nature, yet it is quasi criminal in 
that it is for the protection of the public, and is 
brought because of alleged misconduct of the doctor 
involved. It's consequence is unavoidably punitive, 
despite the fact that it is not designed entirely for 
that purpose. It is not strictly adversary in nature. 
It is essentially a special, somewhat unique, statutory 
proceeding, in which the medical profession (under 
state authorization through the medical disciplinary 
board) inquires into the conduct of a member of the 
profession and determines whether disciplnary action 
is to be taken against him in order to maintain sound 
professional standards of conduct. . . (Emphasis in 
original.) 
Kindschi, 319 P.2d at 825-26. 
Other states have also addressed the issue of whether 
or not administrative proceedings before boards seeking 
disciplinary action against professional licensees are civil 
actions. They too have found that such proceedings are "neither 
civil nor criminal in nature." Nelson v. Real Estate Commission, 
35 Md.App. 334, 370 A.2d 613 (1977); Commerce City Drug v. State 
Board of Pharmacy, 511 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1973). 
Utah lawmakers have recognized the uniqueness of 
administrative proceedings by enacting the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated S 63-46b-l, et seq ("UAPA"). 
That act, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure currently 
governs administrative procedures in this state. The instant 
proceeding, filed prior to the effective date of the UAPA, was 
governed by the "Rules of Procedure for Hearings before the 
Department of Business Regulation" (Adopted June 23, 1983.) The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except as specifically referenced 
in those department rules, had no application to licensing 
matters filed in the administrative forum. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed the specific 
issue of whether or not, absent a specific statute of 
limitations, a general statute of limitations can be applied to 
administrative disciplinary actions. In Colorado State Board of 
Medical Examiners v. Jorqensen, 599 P.2d 869, the Court held 
that, "[T]he general statute of limitations applies to the 
commencement of legal actions-i.e., civil or criminal actions-not 
to the institution of an administrative disciplinary proceeding." 
Applying Colorado's Jorgensen Rule to this case, it is 
clear that the action against Petitioner's license is not a legal 
action, being neither civil nor criminal, but is an 
administrative disciplinary action. Therefore, the general 
statute of limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) does 
not apply. 
Petitioner also argues that the general statute of 
limitations found in Utah Code Annotated S 78-12-25(2) should 
apply to the disciplinary proceeding filed against Petitioner 
because of the language of S 78-12-33, which says: 
MThe limitations prescribed in this article shall apply 
to the actions brought in the name of or for the 
benefit of the State in the same manner as to actions 
by private parties. •• 
This statute clearly applies only to those actions 
wherein the state acts as a private party in a proprietary 
manner. It certainly does not apply to those situations when the 
state is acting in its exclusive governmental police power 
function of protecting the public welfare. 
At common law, the state was immune from statutes of 
limitation under the rule of nullum tempus occurrit 
regi (time does not run against the king). Although 
the doctrine was originally established as a royal 
prerogative similar to sovereign immunity, its role 
under modern law is to prevent the public from 
suffering 'because of the negligence of its officers 
and agents' in failing to assert causes of action which 
belong to the public. The rule applies if the right 
which the governmental unit seeks to assert is in fact 
a right belonging to the general public. It does not 
apply if the right belongs only to the government. 
Trimble v. American Sav. Life Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1131, 
1138 (Ariz.App. 1986). 
When the state, or one of its agencies, is performing 
governmental functions, as opposed to proprietary functions not 
unlike those performed by private individuals, the state must 
specifically waive its immunity. 
Governmental functions are those which are performed 
for the general public with respect to the common 
welfare and for which no compensation or particular 
benefit is received, while 'proprietary functions' are 
exercised when an enterprise is commercial in character 
or is usually carried on by private individuals or is 
for the profit, benefit or advantage of a governmental 
unit conducting the activity. 
State Ex Re. Schneider v. McAfee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 274, 
578 P. 2d 281 (1978). 
Certainly the action taken by the Division of Real 
Estate against the license of Petitioner to practice as a real 
estate broker was purely governmental, and in no way proprietary. 
The Division was seeking to protect the public from Petitioner's 
unprofessional conduct, and its action can in no way be 
interpreted as that of a "private party", inasmuch as the 
regulatory power exercised by the Division and the Commission is 
an exclusively governmental power. 
B. Had the Legislature intended for there to be a 
statute of limitations for administrative licensing disciplinary 
actions, it would have established one within the specific 
statutes governing the Department of Business Regulations or the 
Division of Real Estate. 
The Department of Business Regulations (now the 
Department of Commerce) is governed by chapter 1, Title 13 of the 
Utah Code. The Division of Real Estate was, and is, governed by 
Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-1, et seq. Neither of these two 
bodies of law restrict the filing of administrative actions by 
imposing a statute of limitations. In fact Utah Code Annotated § 
61-2-11 says that the Real Estate Commission, with the 
concurrence of the Executive Director of the Department, may take 
disciplinary action against a license "at any time" if the 
licensee is found guilty of any of the enumerated violations of 
the licensing law. This statutory wording, given its plain 
meaning, certainly implies that the Commission's disciplinary 
actions may be taken without regard to any statute of 
limitations. 
Inasmuch as the whole scheme of licensing professions 
in this state is undertaken for the protection of the public, as 
referenced in Utah Code Annotated § 13-1-1 (1953, as amended) it 
would surely be against public policy to allow licensees, such as 
the Petitioner, to elude accountability for bad acts by simply 
hiding the facts from the applicable regulatory body until after 
a specific time period passed. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S ACTION IN REVOKING THE 
LICENSE OF PETITIONER TO PRACTICE AS A 
PRINCIPAL BROKER IN THE STATE OF UTAH WAS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL 
The Petition filed against Petitioner's license to 
practice as a Real Estate Principal Broker, in Case No. RE 87-08-
02, was filed November 25, 1987, and is therefore a pre-UAPA 
case. The Court reviews pre-UAPA cases using the three pronged 
test found in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). Since 
Petitioner does not challenge the Commission's Findings of Fact 
in this case, and only touches upon the Conclusions of Law 
collaterally in her direct attack upon the sanction imposed by 
the Commission, it will only be necessary for the Division to 
address the standard of review for the conclusions of law and the 
order. 
In reviewing the Commission's Order revoking 
Petitioner's license, this Court must, under the Administrative 
Services rationale, "afford great deference to the technical 
- 14 -
expertise or more extensive experience of the responsible 
agency." Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 610. Although, 
deference to the Commission's expertise is appropriate, the Court 
must also decide whether the Order of Revocation was within the 
bounds of reasonableness or rationality under the circumstances. 
Plaintiff does not dispute the Commission's Findings of 
Fact and in her brief adopts them as the facts in this case. It 
is therefore unnecessary for this Court to determine whether 
there is "evidence of any substance whatever" to support the 
Commission's Findings of Fact. Administrative Services, 658 P.2d 
at 609. However, Petitioner does collaterally attack the 
Commission's Conclusions of Law. The Administrative Services 
standard of review for the application of licensing law to the 
facts, a mixed question of law and fact, requires the appellate 
court to decide whether the Commission's determination was within 
the limits of reasonableness and rationality. Administrative 
Services, 658 P.2d at 609-12; In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32, 36 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The Commission, composed of four professional real 
estate brokers and one lay person, determined that Petitioner was 
Barbara Homeyer's real estate agent from January to October 1982. 
Petitioner's attorney argues in her brief that absent a "listing 
agreement" or "earnest money agreement" there was no contractual 
relationship between Petitioner and Barbara Homeyer.(Petitioner's 
Brief p.12) This contention ignores the fact that Ms. Homeyer 
was a prospective buyer, not seller, therefore there was no house 
to be listed for sale. Earnest money agreements memorialize 
- 15 -
offers and acceptances, and Petitioner's efforts in Ms. Homeyer's 
behalf never got to the point where a formal offer was tendered. 
It would be a rare event indeed for a buyer's agent to enter into 
a written contract with her principal prior to the point where an 
offer was tendered to a seller via an earnest monery sales 
agreement. 
The record clearly indicates that Petitioner was Ms. 
Homeyer's real estate agent, and that relationship existed from 
at least January to October, 1982. (Findings of Fact, nos. 
4,9,10) Petitioner also took possession of much of Ms. Homeyer's 
personal property for the purpose of safeguarding that property 
and facilitating its use in the purchase of a home from a 
prospective seller. (Findings of Fact, no. 4) Petitioner had 
never undertaken a real estate transaction involving the amount 
of property owned by Ms. Homeyer, and she did not involve her 
broker either in the decision to use the personal property for a 
down-payment or in her taking possession of the property. 
(Transcript, pp. 166,167) Although, Ms. Homeyer made a number of 
demands for an accounting of her property and its disposition, as 
well as demands for the return of the unsold property, Petitioner 
failed to adequately answer those demands. (Findings of Fact, 
nos. 8,10) Ms. Homeyer was forced to initiate litigation against 
Petitioner, wherein by stipulation a value was placed on her 
property. Ms. Homeyer eventually won a judgment against 
Petitioner and recovered some of her property, but has never 
recovered any monies from Petitioner due to Petitioner's 
converting her pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy into a Chapter 7. 
(Findings of Fact, nos. 11,12,13) 
It was to the facts above that the Commission had to 
apply the special body of law which governs the real estate 
profession. Certainly, there was evidence that Petitioner was 
Ms. Homeyer's agent for the purpose of aiding her in locating and 
purchasing a home. According to both Ms. Homeyer and Petitioner 
that relationship was established in January 1982. In Division 
Exhibit 7, an October 21, 1982 letter from Petitioner to Barbara 
Homeyer, there is very clear reference on the second page to 
Petitioner's past and current efforts to find some kind of home 
for Ms. Homeyer to purchase using proceeds from the sale of the 
Homeyer personal property. Therefore, there was adequate 
evidence of an ongoing real estate agent/principal relationship 
into October 1982. It was incumbent upon the Commissioners to 
use their knowledge and expertise in the real estate profession, 
as Petitioner's peers, to determine if Petitioner's conduct as a 
real estate agent violated the standards of the profession. The 
Commission found that Petitioner's actions in regards to Ms. 
Homeyer's property once she came into possession of it was 
patently wrong. First of all, she violated Rule 9(a)(7) of the 
Rules of the Commission, by failing to deliver the property to 
her broker. Secondly, Petitioner consistently acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the best interests of her principal, Ms. 
Homeyer, by: selling items without authorization and failing to 
remit sale proceeds to Ms. Homeyer; failing to return property 
upon demand; failing to account for property or monies in her 
possession; delivering property to third parties, which was 
unrecoverable by Ms. Homeyer; and selling property at below fair 
market value. 
The end result of Petitioner's actions were that Ms. 
Homeyer never did get a house, and the property she had hoped to 
use as a down-payment was to a large extent dissipated and lost. 
Ms. Homeyer was forced to litigate her rights against Petitioner, 
and while she received a judgment against Petitioner, she never 
recovered a penny of the judgment due to Petitioner's bankruptcy. 
The Commission clearly found, based on the facts established in 
the hearing, that Petitioner's actions were inconsistent with her 
client's best interests, a serious breach of the fiduciary duty 
owed by an agent to her principal, and in fact resulted in 
serious harm to the client. Therefore, a conclusion that 
Petitioner was "unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such a manner as to 
safeguard the interests of the public," was both reasonable and 
rational. 
Petitioner argues that the revocation of her license 
was an unduly harsh sanction, and urges a lesser sanction on this 
Court. Again, the Court must review the sanction using the 
intermediate standard set forth above. Given the Commission's 
expertise and knowledge of the real estate profession, was the 
order revoking Petitioner's license reasonable or rational? 
Petitioner would have this Court accept the premise 
that the aggravating circumstances of this case should somehow be 
mitigated by the simple passage of time. The fallacy of that 
premise is that time in no way mitigated the damage that 
Petitioner's actions caused. The fact of the matter is that 
during much of the intervening six years, Ms. Homeyer was 
struggling through the litigation resulting from Petitioner's 
actions. 
Petitioner also skirts the issue that this is the 
second disciplinary action taken against her license. In Case 
No. 1737, Petitioner was disciplined by the Commission for gross 
incompetence and violating the fiduciary duty she owed her 
clients. Interestingly, Petitioner's activity in the earlier 
case was contemporaneous with the Homeyer matter. In Case No. 
1737, Petitioner's license was also revoked, but revocation was 
stayed in favor of a one year suspension of her license, followed 
by a two year period of probation. After an unsuccessful appeal 
to the Third District Court in that case, which resulted in the 
court's upholding the Commission's Order, Petitioner served her 
suspension during 1985-86. 
Petitioner would have the Court believe that the 
Division of Real Estate thoroughly investigates each licensee, 
and therefore the issuance of broker's licenses or the absence of 
intervening disciplinary action is a "seal of approval." The 
Division's resources are such that only complaints which are 
brought to the Division's attention can be investigated, and 
there is no sweeping, ongoing investigation of the real estate 
industry. The complaint which resulted in the November, 1987 
filing of Case No. RE-87-08-02 was made only several months prior 
to then. Had the Division been aware of this case prior to that 
point in time, it certainly would have taken earlier action. 
Petitioner did receive a broker's license in January 1987, prior 
to this compliant being made to the Division, based upon the 
information which she provided to the Division. 
The Commission is in the best position to judge the 
appropriateness of sanctions, and how those sanctions will 
protect the public. Given the circumstances of this case-the 
egregious nature of Petitioner's breach of fiduciary duty to her 
client, the ongoing finaancial harm suffered by that client, and 
the prior disciplinary sanction-the Commission acted reasonably 
and rationally in ordering the revocation of Petitioner's 
license. 
CONCLUSION 
Administrative disciplinary proceedings are neither 
civil nor criminal actions and are therefore not subject to a 
general statute of limitations. If the Legislature had intended 
to limit disciplinary actions in the area of real estate 
licensing, it would have specified such a limitation in the 
statutes governing the Department of Business Regulation or the 
Division of Real Estate. But rather than providing a statute of 
limitations, the Legislature provided that the Commission and the 
Executive Director could take disciplinary actions "at any time" 
a licensee was found guilty of the enumerated violations. 
The Commission's Conclusions of Law and Order were 
reasonable and rational under the facts of this case and the law 
applicable to it- The Commission is charged with assisting in the 
regulation of the real estate profession so as to protect the 
public welfare. Certainly as a group of Petitioner's peers, the 
Commissioners are in a much better position to judge her conduct 
and the effect that conduct has on the public and the profession. 
THEREFORE, the Division respectfully asks the Court to 
affirm the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order revoking the license of Juanita Taft Rogers to act as a 
real estate principal broker in the State of Utah. 
SUBMITTED this ^ 5 day of October, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312) 
Attorney General of Utah 
byt ^jyfrjxjc. 
SHtflLA PAGE f#4«9&y 
Assistant Atfe<frney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div, 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to be mailed, postage prepaid, on 
this . S" day of October, 1989, to: 
Gary B. Weight, Esq. 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "LM 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 
BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the license of Juanita Taft Rogers 
to act as a Real Estate Principal Broker 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Case No. RE-87-08-02 
Appearances: 
Sheila Page for the Division of Real Estate 
Gary H. Weight for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on September 20,1988 before J. Steven 
EkJund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Business Regulation. Thereafter, certain 
preliminary motions were presented by respective counsel. 
Based thereon, Counts I and III set forth in the Petition, dated November 25,1987, were dismissed. 
Further, Count IV was amended to reflect the rule to be properly designated therein. Respondent's motions 
to dismiss the ins'uuu proceeding on the basis that the hearing should be conducted by the Commission 
rather than the Administrative Law Judge and that the Division should be estopped to take any action on 
Respondent's license were denied 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Administrative Law Judge, being fully in the 
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed as a sales agent by the Division of Real 
Estate. As relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with principal broker David R. Harman as of January 
1982. On September 1,1982, she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with 
principal broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her affiliation with Mr. 
Michaels and became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company. 
2. By Order, dated August 17,1983, Respondent's license was suspended for one year and 
thereafter placed on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Said order was based 
on conduct which occurred between December 10,1981 and August 22,1982. Respondent's conduct in that 
regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation of the fiduciary duty owed to her clients 
in that transaction. Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on January IS, 1987. 
3. In January 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing 
a home. Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced, resided in a home jointly owned by herself and her ex-
husband. Since there had been no property settlement relative to her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's ex-husband 
was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide 
a down payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various items of inherited personal property. 
4. During Januairy 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement, whereby 
Respondent was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective seller who 
would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down payment for the purchase of a home. On February 
21,1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer then delivered that 
property to Respondent, which was held in storage under Respondent's control. The property was so 
transferred to Respondent as the means to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate Respondent's 
access to that property if a prospective seller was located. 
5. Between February and late-April 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two 
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as to those items of 
Ms. Homeyer's personal property which would be acceptable in lieu of a cash down payment. When it 
became apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the above-described terms would be realized, she 
authorized Respondent to sell certain items as the means to provide cash for the down payment necessary to 
purchase a home. 
6. During March and April 1982, Respondent had some of Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and 
certain items were sold in antique shows. However, as of late April 1982, no progress in locating a 
suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer had received no monies from Respondent relative to the sale 
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of some of her property and Respondent had taken certain property from storage and sold it without Ms 
Homeyer's authorization Further, Respondent never advised her principal broker of her acDviues nor did 
she deliver to him any of the funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property. 
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer underwent foot surgery and was advised that her 
condiuon could be cancerous. At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether 
that would occur pnor to her possible death. On May 5,1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Respondent and 
they executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of her personal property *o Respondent 
for sale and/or exchange and authorized Respondent to liquidate that property. The agreement further 
provided that if all property held by Respondent was not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the 
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor children. 
8 During the next two months, Ms Homeyer was never advised as to the status of her property 
and was unable to contact Respondent in that regard In mid-July 1982, Ms Homeyer retained counsel and 
made written demand that Respondent return all personal property in her possession and provide an 
accounting as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property which had been in her possession 
9 By letter, dated October 21,1982, Respondent generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts 
which had been undertaken to appraise, restore and/or sell some of the property in her possession 
Respondent further menuoned various costs incurred as to the appraisal and restoration of that property 
Respondent also reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken to produce funds necessary for a down 
payment for a home or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had yet been 
identified Respondent requested Ms. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what you want to do with the 
housing thing" and she advised Ms. Homeyer of a hsung for a two bedroom townhouse duplex and pondered 
that Ms Homeyer could live in one side and rent the other. 
10 By letter, dated October 28,1982, Ms. Homeyer advised Respondent that purchase of the 
duplex would not be economically feasible and reiterated that no accounting had been received as to the 
status of her property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated October 29,1982, a second demand was 
made that Respondent return all items of personal property entrusted to her. When compliance with that 
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demand was not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No accounting was provided to Ms. 
Homeyer until July 9,1986,, when Respondent returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin. 
11. By Stipulation, dated October 7,1986, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent identified the status of 
tome of the property which had been in Respondent's possession. That property consisted of guns, 
cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin collection, silver, jewelry, flatware, china, pewter, furniture, 
household and other miscellaneous items. The value of the property which Respondent sold was agreed to 
have been $6,530.50 and Respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property. It was agreed that 
certain property, valued at $6,799.50, was delivered by Respondent to third parties and that said property had 
not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer. It was also agreed that certain property still in Respondent's 
possession should be valued at $4,820.50. 
12. Some of the: property which Ms. Homeyer had delivered to Respondent was subsequently 
returned to her. However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 30,1986, the Court 
concluded that Respondent had sold some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with Ms. 
Homeyer's possession and control of some of the property by intentionally refusing to return it and had 
converted the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use. By reason thereof, the Court 
entered judgment on October 30,1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer totalling $2,035.50 as a result of 
Respondent's breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. Homeyer, $4,495.00 as a result of 
Respondent's conversion of proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a result of Respondents 
conversion of property upon transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as a result of Respondents 
conversion of property still in her possession. 
13. In the above-referenced Findings of Fact, the Court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated 
bankruptcy preoceedings on July 22,1985 and thai Respondent had been listed as a creditor in said 
proceedings. The Court further noted thai an order was entered in those proceedings on October 30,1985, 
whereby Ms. Homeyer was discharged of all claims, including those of Respondent relative to expenses she 
incurred in her efforts to repair, restore and dispose of Ms. Homeyer's property. The instant record also 
reflects that Respondent initiated bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October 30, 
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1986 Judgment, an order was entered in those bankropty proceedings relative to Respondent, whereby the 
just-stated Judgment was discharged. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent urges that her May 5,1982 agreement with Ms. Homeyer terminated the real estate 
agent/principal relationship which had previously existed between them. Respondent further asserts that her 
subsequent conduct pursuant to that contract had no relevance respecting her status as a licensed sales agent 
and provides no basis upon which to enter a sanction as to that licensure. Respondent further urges that 
there is no proper basis to now conclude she is incompetent or unworthy to practice as a principal broker, 
inasmuch as whatever occurred prior to May 5,1982 does not reflect either a continuing or presently 
existing pattern of misconduct 
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, provides that a real estate license may 
be suspended or revoked if the licensee is found guilty of: 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associated broker, or 
sales agent in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public; 
* • * » * 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission, or the rules 
adopted by the commission and the division. 
Rule 9(a)(7) further provides: 
All consideration received by a salesman in connection with a real estate transaction 
in which he is engaged on behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by him to his 
broker.... 
Upon a considered review of the conflicting evidence presented, Respondent's assertion that the 
May 5,1982 agreement transformed what had been a real estate transaction between a principal and an agent 
to that of a contract between private parties is not well founded. The May 5,1982 agreement does not 
reference the previously existing relationship between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent and, importantly, does 
not explicitly sever or alter that relationship. If it were Respondent's intent to effect a shift in her existing 
relationship with Ms. Homeyer, it was incumbent upon Respondent to utilize language clearly reflective of 
Ihat intent, particularly when Respondent had come into possession of Ms. Homeyer's property as her agent 
in a real estate transaction, Respondent had already disposed of some of that property, and it was anticipated 
that she would retain possession of the remaining property with the written authorization to liquidate it 
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Nothing in the May 5,1986 agreement reflects that Ms. Homeyer no longer desired to obtain 
another home or that Respondent would no longer attempt to locate a home for Ms. Homeyer. 
Significantly, Respondent's efforts in thai regard did not cease after that agreement was executed. To the 
contrary. Respondent acknowledged in her subsequent correspondence with Ms. Homeyer that continuing 
efforts to locate a home had been made . As of October 21,1982, possibilities in that regard were still 
being explored. Simply pot, the May 5,1982 agreement did not change the relationship between Ms. 
Homeyer and Respondent as it relates to the purpose for which possession of Ms. Homeyer's property was 
initially transferred to Respondent Thus, the manner in which Respondent disposed of that property is a 
matter properly congizable by the Commission as to whether any basis exists to enter a sanction on 
Respondent's licensure as a real estate principal broker. 
Concededly, the transaction under review occurred approximately six years ago and there is no 
evidence that Respondent has engaged in any misconduct since that time. Nevertheless, a violation of 
Section 61-2-11(8) may lx established upon sufficient evidence of aggravated misconduct by a licensee 
during the course of a single real estate transaction. The instant record clearly reflects that Respondent held, 
sold or otherwise disposed of Ms. Homeyer's property in a manner entirely inconsistent with Ms. 
Homeyer's interest in thai property. In certain instances, Respondent acted without authorization from Ms. 
Homeyer and failed to safeguard the la tier's interest in the property which had been entrusted to her. 
AJthough Respondent's conduct was not governed by an statutorily mandated fiduciary- duty between herself 
and Ms. Homeyer, Respondent clearly owed such a duty as a sales agent to Ms. Homeyer throughout the 
time under review and she failed to properly discharge that duty. 
In addition to Respondent's breach of the fiduciary duty which she owed to Ms. Homeyer, 
Respondent failed to deliver to her principal broker the consideration she received from the sale of Ms. 
Homeyer's property. Thus, Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(15) and Rule 9(a)(7) relative thereto. 
Furthermore, Respondent knew that she had been given the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer which 
could be used to efTect the purchase of another home. Without explanation. Respondent failed to account 
for those assets when repeated requests to do so had been made between July 1982 and October 1982, yet 
she ostensibly held herself out to Ms. Homeyer as being willing to continue to assist in the search for a 
home. 
Arguably, the agreement between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent was somewhat unique and 
Respondent may have engaged in relatively unconventional eflorts in her attempt to obtain a home for Ms. 
Homeyer. Respondent may also have encountered unforeseen difficulties in liquidating the property to 
generate cash and in her on-going relationship with Ms. Homeyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
Respondent should have consistently acted in Ms. Homeyer's best interests and there is simply no evidence 
that she did so. To the contrary, the egregious nature of Respondent's misconduct operated to produce 
substantial financial harm to Ms. Homeyer. Based thereon, and given the disciplinary sanction which was 
entered in 1983, an appropriately severe sanction should now enter as to Respondent's licensure. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate principal 
broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective consistent with the provisions of Section 61-2-
12(1X0-
Of] Dated this .day of December, 1988. 




The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Recommended Order are accepted as written. It Is hereby 
ordered that the Utah real estate license of Juanlta Taft 
Rogers will be revoked effective February 14, 1989. 
Dated this h*- day of £>/' ,^-r,lo.r- . 1988. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE/COMMISSION 
&As/u^L4fa *-K*4Z <s: 
FREDRICK FROERER, I I I 





/JERRY -HAWLEY J 
PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER 
The above Orde.r Is confirmed and approved by the 
undersigned this \ '. day of v^~ , 1988. 
V.^r V 
WILLIAM E. DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR 
PO BOX 45802 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145 
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6747 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of PETITION 
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS to Act 
as a Real Estate Principal Broker CASE NO. RE87-08-02 
The Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through 
Its Director, Richard M. Mercer, upon knowledge and belief, hereby 
complains and alleges as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The cause of action was Investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that Juanlta Taft Rogers (Rogers) has engaged In acts and 
practices which constitute violations of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as amended). 
JURISDICTION 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 provides that the Utah 
Real Estate Commission may suspend or revoke the Real Estate license of 
any salesagent or broker who, while engaging In acts for which such a 
license Is required, Is found guilty of: 
a. •...(6) Falling within a reasonable time, to account 
for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which belong to 
others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those 
funds from the purpose for which they were received;" 
b. "...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such manner as to 
safeguard the Interests of the public;" 
c. *.. v15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order 
of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the Commission and the 
Dlvis Ion. 
d. •...(16) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to 
his principal In a real estate transaction. 
2. Rogers Is a real estate principal broker duly licensed by the 
State of Utah under License No. PB 14700. 
3. At all times material to this action, Rogers was acting in her 
capacity as a real estate licensee. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. In January, 1982, Rogers was a salesagent affiliated with 
principal broker David R. Harman. On September 1, 1982, she terminated 
t\er affiliation with Harman and became affiliated with principal 
broker A.J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her 
affiliation with Michaels and became affiliated with K.M. Wool ley & 
Company. Rogers' license was suspended from September 15, 1985 through 
September 15, 1986, and placed on probation from September 15, 1986 
through September 15, 1988, as a result of case #1737, which Involved 
a 1981*1982 real estate transaction. Rogers obtained a license as a 
principal broker on January 15, 1987. 
5. In or about January, 1982, Homeyer and Rogers orally agreed 
that Homeyer would give Rogers some Inherited personal property to 
hold. Rogers was to find a seller of a home who would accept persona 
property Instead of cash for a down payment. If such a seller could 
not be found, Rogers was to arrange for the sale of some of the 
property to generate cash for a down payment. t-f a sale was 
consummated, Rogers would receive some of the personal property In an 
amount equal to a 6% commission. 
* During February and March, 1982, Homeyer delivered numerous 
units owned by a Mr. Miller. Miller had ll*»ed the storage units for 
sale with Rogers. 
7. A seller who was willing to take personal property was 
not found. On or about May 6, 1982, Homeyer gave Rogers written 
authorization to liquidate the property. 
8. Rogers sold a number of Items for a total of $4,495.00 which 
had a fair market value of $6,530.50. Rogers did not deliver the sale 
proceeds to her principal broker to hold In trust for Homeyer. Rogers 
gave possession of certain Items valued at $6,799.50 to various 
Individuals with Instructions to repair, restore, or appraise the 
I terns. 
9. In or about July, 1982, Homeyer orally demanded that Rogers 
give her the proceeds of the sales and return the balance of the 
personal property which had not been sold. In July, 1982 and on 
October 29, 1982, Homeyer's attorneys demanded that Rogers return 
all property still held, and account for all property which had been 
transferred, sold, or disposed of by Rogers. (^Rogers refused to comply 
until ordered to do so by court order In July, 1986./ 
10. Rogers did not turn over to Homeyer the $4,495.00 In proceeds 
from the sale of Items, nor did she retrieve the $6,799.50 worth of 
Items which had been given to others to repair, restore, or appraise. 
In addition, Rogers still had In her possession or had otherwise 
disposed of other Items valued at $4,820.50. 
11. On October 30, 1986, Homeyer obtained a Judgment In the 
amount of $18,150.00 against Rogers based on conversion of personal 
property and sale proceeds and on breach of fiduciary duty. After the 
Judgment was entered, Rogers converted her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which 
had been pending since 1981, to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Homeyer has 
filed a $10,000.00 claim against the Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
COUNT I 
12. The Di.islon realleges and Incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 11 as If specifically 
set out herein. 
13. Utah Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (19539 as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked if the 
licensee Is found guilty of: "...(6) Falling within a reasonable time, 
to account for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which 
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting 
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;* 
14. As outlined above, Rogers sold Items of personal property end 
received $4,495o00, which she did not remit to Homeyer or account for. 
Rogers commingled the funds with her own and expended them. 
15. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (6) as amended. 
COUNT I I 
16. The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs No. 1 through 15 as If specifically 
set out herein. 
17. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked if 
licensee Is found guilty of: •...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent 
to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such 
manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;* 
16. As outlined above, Rogers received personal property 
from Homeyer which was to be used In connection with a real estate 
transaction, and failed to safeguard the property. Numerous Items we 
delivered to parties who did not return them. Other Items were kept 
Rogers or otherwise dissipated. Additional Items were sold by Roger; 
below market value. Rogers did not give the sales proceeds to her 
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censee I In a re " 
22. As outlined above, Homeyer * :rusted Rogers ** * personal 
Iijiii upeir i i, 1 in in PI I 111 I Mill PII p r o p o s e d real e s t a t e t r a n s a c t I cvn Roger s 
fa I - p r o t e c \ - t ; . ,r * a n ^ r * ^ i < ^ tn r e t u r n -» - - > t* 
when requester Rogers sold a number Items at. be I * m a r k e t 
v 
23. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute v'" i, la" "r', r' Utah 
Code Annotated Section 61-2- 1. s amended. 
COUN" _v 
24. The Division 'leges and Incorporates by reference Its 
allegations set forth ... paragraphs 1 4o. I through 23 as lf specIfIca I I i 
set out herein. 
25- Utah Code Annotated Section f- r *• " P ^ -- amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended ^evoked If 
the licensee Is found g\ jllty of: i el I 
this chapter
 t a I Order c: i f the Comm I s s I o n, o i the Rules adopted D > t n e 
Comml ss lie i a i dl 1:1 t "" 
26. . Rule ±dt, adopted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated beet Ion > "" 
(1953, as amended equlres that all funds received by a licensee In 




' " -» • ' » >" » * itvi cikii-f a t r ust account within three bar ik I ng days. 
27. As out. lined above, Rogers sold Homeyer's personal property 
to generate funds for a down payment on a real estate purchase, but did 
not deliver the proceeds to her principal broker for deposit Into the 
broker's real estate trust account. 
26. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Rule 
4.2 and Utah Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (15) as amended. 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. That Rogers be adjudged and decreed to have engaged In the 
acts alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging In the above acts* Rogers be adjudged and 
decreed to be guilty of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-2-11 ($), (8), (15). and (16) (1953, as amended). 
3. That Rogers license to act as a real estate licensee be 
suspended or revoked accordingly. 
DATED this J^P day of A/£l*64&fe*' 1987. 
Zt*/J/A4&t 
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Appeared before me this 2&4— day of NOvenrvke.**' 1987. 
who deposes and says that the Information listed above Is true to th< 
best of his knowledge and belief. 
./ \ NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
. « » 
Residing a t : ^tJJr \jM*- U-*y,
 x LUrxX. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
6%jdfa++ k iS\^r^ULT 
»• rt*v served the foregoing 
A C O D V of the foregoing document has been mailed this day prepaid 
to Gary Selght. attorney for Juanlta Taft Rogers, at Aldrlch. Nelson. 
Weight 8. Esplln. P.O. Box L. Provo. Utah 84603. 





1NDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional service* are desired, and complete items 3 and 4, 
xn addraes in the "RETURN TO" apace on the reverse sfete, Felkire to do this wfl! prevent this 
rom being returned to vou. TrwReturn receto fw wW £"?**** y o u t h > 
red to_and the date of dajtverv. For i 
laitar for fees and check box(es) for additional service(s) 
1 to whom delivered, date, and addressee's address 
Idressad 
ta Ta 
ng services ere aveTlaiJercormitt 
2 . D Restricted Delivery 
jini ft Rogers 
Taft Company 
11 Locust Lane 
DVO. Utah 84604 
»11,Feb. 1986 
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21 CttoW, 19B2 
Rrovo, Utah 
Antiques Z e x . Uiich / I personal property of Barbara Hcneyer... 
Vt2T Barbara: 
As I n*r.tic*>ed tc you a veek or so ago when you called, I have fi*ed 1.7 a current 
i i s t cf al l the izr:s which we found In yoo* one root wh*ch your ex-Surha^d had 
locked. I told you I'd ge: that dene the day we went to see Star* Snith, attorney 
i;i American Fork, Utah. Now that you decided not to go to Stan SnLth and that 
Air: Young i s net representing jru, I hove asked Barbara to deliver a copy of 
the personal property hst to Mr. R*tert Mbody. I apologize for ncc gettir-
i t to you sooner, but hope dropping i t off to Mr. Moody's office will be a 
help to you. I had also tcld ycc I'd have a copy of £ is l i s t dreppec off 
at the office of .%Sr. Alan Young. I have asked Barbara to do that a l so . . . . I 
know he rroy not need i t new, but thought i t wouldn't hurt for hia to have i t 
in his f i les . 
The original docxer.r which you ask*d the*: we write 4 sign, when Betty oyta was 
trc witnesst i s in cJ-se hands of ny attorney, Mr. Stanley *. Smith of American 
F.:rk, Utah. I sent you S 3ctty a note tellllng you tivt.vas where the original 
dxirer.t was. I thought i t best fr>r neither of
 %us to hold the docxant. I 
\>z£*+ it givss "re full liquidation r^tspcr^ibility S/or seTing as is or i a 
restored condition. Hc\.ever, the rain antiq-.-e shew that sel ls the nvst *s 
in April... There i s ncv one in SX b~t I crr-nct afford tu pay the S2JC.'JG ar.tr/ 
fee and the iXO-wX) for a van to teul the iters ther* *id then pay $uO>5-0C 
f^r.laijoj to 'r.rjc1' and sell and nan the fco/h fcr fou~ full davs. I *usc paid 
_ ^ > . A tu .*i>e i-j* l i t t l e tanles refinishel. and I \ : get to dig up t!v f:r*ii 
S&o.OU to pay for the iters refi^sr.ed by tt:*. lady (h^tovl died) in C-uiinrni^. 
nave >cu any 4*ep p ckets of gold? The retvoritim and Aipplr^ have toc^Ied t 
abix.t Sl.SX.CO f rr the itess. Hc^ve:, thtv shcJld -ak': err^h to ccver that f 
end upholster thi ireirs in the spring Siile. l . . a s I •a.^tioreJ er i i er , thc 
Gx> Coo Cio-J* w^ s evaluated by a Mr. Lottar Jccka (Genu*. Cock sferi i l i i t ) and 
he snid i t would tc*e S500.0Q in parti* and Utirr to g<.r i t Ln vor.cr* c^diti-x 
and the ler.st i t --cild cost would be $3:0.00....and h* thought i : cruld not K-11 
for any ixre than t!*t. Houcer, I found r*nother nun w s&iU it can b* restore: 
for l ^ s f but h/» w.uld c i l l x the quote before they surtc-d wcrk x r . . , , . I 
told him to pwt i t oi hold as I could K-Z feed any more ccney into th* iter* 
at:that tire. The;? i s a private busir.sss in SIC who a y trie STK C: the iiijy*: 
piecas on consijrrft ard perhaps they'll sell by Xie~. iiuwever, he trir>s thpy 
a^ht to go nrr-i.y in the spring show. T i l pun to .-n:er th*?.t u^ ae enj get 
sax of this tuned into Cisi:. V I tcld yoj# T WHS .tlo xo give >t.>. »i>iver sn 
anti^-e o; rri;^ sppriistd at >*7$.0J to i^ y for the t.;jv Jvxxs s -^ prexreJ, p:c!-*d 
and rjs.ned the bootn in SLC. She w u with '« tc h^* tie clock ev.u*itc\i 
1br<-::.rat wt»e-.':r told y x i t *uJ *oM «.«;e^<ere for S1.9CO.00 ha-u :c lx» d:curing. 
*--•*—'i*** \g±i j - s*xh poor c;naiticnt f».»i.v s w«» shuuld hj.e sol.! it i l l ai mc 
-*•»- ?>nr tr«e £::•*: a^ralse* of SJ/TU.'T for the 
l;
— <^  I cun scrape up 
